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COMMENTS
REMOVAL OF ACTION FROM STATE COURT TO
BANKRUPTCY COURT
The issue discussed in this comment is: "Under what circumstances
will a United States Bankruptcy Court accept removal of an action
from state court to the Bankruptcy Court for hearing and possibly
final adjudication?"
Let us assume the following hypothetical. Corporation X files a
voluntary petition pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.'
Subsequent to that filing, Corporation X enters into an insurance
contract with Insurance Company A. Shortly thereafter, Corporation
X cancels the policy and obtains insurance from Insurance Company
B, all before-any Chapter 11 reorganization is approved by the
bankruptcy court. Insurance Company A then brings an action in
state court to recover a premium allegedly owed by Corporation X. 2
For any number of reasons, Corporation X wishes to transfer the
action from the state court to the bankruptcy court where the Chapter
11 reorganization is pending.3
The starting point for answering the question illustrated above is
contained in Title 28 of the United States Code. Three statutes in

1. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1101, et seq. (1979).
2. Because the "claim" or "cause of action" against Corporation X did
not arise until after Corporation X filed the bankruptcy petition, the automatic stay
of 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (1979) would not apply. See Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. Sanyo Electric, Inc., 33 B.R. 996 (Bankr. N.D.Ga. 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d
1465 (Bankr. 1 th Cir. 1984); Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co., Inc., 744 F.2d
332 (Bankr. 3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985); Continental Air Lines
v. Hillblom (In re Continental Air Lines), 61 B.R. 758 (Bankr. S.D.Tex. 1986);
Holland America Insurance Co. v. Succession of Roy, 777 F.2d 992 (Bankr. 5th
Cir. 1985).
3. The most obvious reasons, of course, would be to minimize legal fees
and obtain a speedier adjudication of claims.
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particular address different aspects of the question. In general, these
three statutes address jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts 4 cases which
may be removed to the bankruptcy courts,5 and the procedures for
removal. 6 It is clear from these statutes that in deciding whether

4. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334 (Supp. 1987) provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district courts
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction
on a court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall
have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising
under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.
(c)(1) Nothing in this section prevents a district court in the interest of
justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect to State law,
from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding under title 11 or arising
in or related to a case under title 11.
(2) Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a State
law claim or State law cause of action, related to a case under title 11 but
not arising under title 11 or arising in a case under title 11, with respect to
which an action could not have been commenced in a court of the United
States absent jurisdiction under this section, the district court shall abstain
from hearing such proceeding if an action is commenced and can be timely
adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction. Any decision to
abstain made under this subsection is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise.
This subsection shall not be construed to limit the applicability of the stay
provided for by section 362 of title 11, United States Code, as such section
applies to an action affecting the property of the estate in bankruptcy.
(d) The district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced or is
pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever
located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of property
of the estate.
5. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1452 (Supp. 1987) provides:
(a) A party may remove any claim or cause of action in a civil action
other than a proceeding before the United States Tax Court or a civil action
by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory
power, to the district court for the district where such civil action is pending,
if such district court has jurisdiction of such claim or cause of action under
section 1334 of this title.
(b) The court to which such claim or cause of action is removed may
remand such claim or cause of action on any equitable ground. An order
entered under this subsection remanding a claim or cause of action, or a
decision to not remand, is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise.
6. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157 (Supp. 1987) provides:
Section 157. Procedures
(a) Each district court may provide that any or all cases under title 11
and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a
case under title II shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district.
(b)(l) Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under title 11
and all core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title
11, referred under subsection (a) of this section, and may enter appropriate
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Corporation X may remove the action to the bankruptcy court, one

orders and judgments, subject to review under section 158 of this title.
(2) Core proceedings include, but are not limited to (A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions
from property of the estate, and estimation of claims or interests
for the purposes of confirming a plan under chapter 11, 12, or 13
of title 11 but not the liquidation or estimation of contingent or
unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death claims against
the estate for purposes of distribution in a case under title 11;
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the
estate;
(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;
(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
(G) motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay;
(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances;
(I) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts;
(J) objections to discharges;
(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens;
(L) confirmations of plans;
(M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use of
cash collateral;
(N) orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting
from claims brought by the estate against persons who have not filed claims
against the estate; and
(0) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate
or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder
relationship, except personal injury tort or wrongful death claims.
(3) The bankruptcy judge shall determine, on the judge's own motion or
on timely motion of a party, whether a proceeding is a core proceeding under
this subsection or is a proceeding that is otherwise related to a case under
title 11. A determination that a proceeding is not a core proceeding shall not
be made solely on the basis that its resolution may be affected by State law.
(4) Non-core proceedings under section 157(b)(2)(B) of title 28, United
States Code, shall not be subject to the mandatory abstention provisions of
section 1334(c)(2).
(5) The district court shall order that personal injury tort and wrongful
death claims shall be tried in the district court in which the bankruptcy case
is pending, or in the district court in the district in which the claim arose, as
determined by the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending.
(c)(1) A bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding that is not a core
proceeding but that is otherwise related to a case under title 11. In such
proceeding, the bankruptcy judge shall submit proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law to the district court, and any final order or judgment shall
be entered by the district judge after considering the bankruptcy judge's
proposed findings and conclusions and after reviewing de novo those matters
to which any party has timely and specifically objected.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection,
the district court, with the consent of all parties to the proceeding, may refer
a proceeding related to a case under title 11 to a bankruptcy judge to hear
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must first determine whether the action in the state court is a "core"
proceeding or an action which is merely "related to" the proceedings
in the bankruptcy court. The importance of characterizing a proceeding as either a "core" proceeding or as a "related" proceeding
becomes apparent upon examination of the advantages that a core
proceeding enjoys when the question of transferability arises. In a
"related" proceeding, as opposed to a "core" proceeding, (1) the
bankruptcy judge does not have the authority to enter final orders
or judgments without the consent of all parties to the proceeding, 7
and (2) mandatory abstention may be applicable.' The next question
then obviously is: "How does one know if the particular proceeding
at issue is a core proceeding or a related proceeding?"
To answer this question, one should first proceed to 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 157(b)(2). There are fifteen nonexclusive illustrations of core proceedings (which bankruptcy judges "may hear and determine" '9 )
provided in section 157 (b)(2).10 Each of the proceedings listed in
section 157 (b)(2) falls within one of four distinguishable categories.
Those categories are: (1) matters of administration; (2) avoiding
actions; (3) matters concerning property of the estate; and, (4) other
actions." Category (1), "matters of administration," encompasses
the type of proceedings listed in subparts (A), (B), (D), (G), (I), (J),
and (L).12 Category (2), "avoiding actions," includes the type of
proceedings contained in section 157 (b)(2)(F) and (H). 3 The third
category, "matters concerning property of the estate," includes subparts (E), (K), (M), and (N).' 4 The fourth, and last, category, "other

and determine and to enter appropriate orders and judgments, subject to
review under section 158 of this title.
(d) The district court may withdraw, in whole or in part, any case or
proceeding referred under this section, on its own motion or on timely motion
of any party, for cause shown. The district court shall, on timely motion of

a party, so withdraw a proceeding if the court determines that resolution of

the proceeding requires consideration of both title 11 and other laws of the
United States regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate com-

merce.
7.

See 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(c)(1).

8. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(c)(2).
9. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(1).
10. See supra note 6.
11.
12.

King, Collier on Bankruptcy, § 3.01, at 3-37.
Id. The proceedings which fall within this first category are proceedings

which are obviously unique to bankruptcy cases. Accordingly, there has been almost
no litigation regarding bankruptcy court jurisdiction in these matters. Id.

13.
14.

Id.
Id. at 3-39.
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actions," includes the type of proceedings contained in subparts (C)
and (0).'1
The language of the various subparts which are included in the
first three categories makes it perfectly clear that the contract action
by the insurance company could not be removed pursuant to any of
those categories.'16 However, the fourth category, "other actions,"
includes section 157(b)(2)(O)."7 According to that subpart, core proceedings include "other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the

assets of the estate or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the
equity security holder relationship, except personal injury tort or

wrongful death claims."' 8 The broad language of subpart (0) lends
itself to an argument that the hypothetical action against the Chapter
11 debtor by the insurance company would fall within the parameters

of the fourth category of core proceedings. However, the courts have
not been willing to give such an all-encompassing interpretation to
subpart (0), which, like subpart (A), has been called a "catch-all"
provision. 19
One of the most respected commentators in the field of bankruptcy
has stated that core proceedings are those which arise in title 11

15. Id. at 3-41.
16. Obviously, the common law contract action is not a matter concerning
the administration of the proceeding in the bankruptcy court, such as an order in
respect to obtaining credit or a confirmation-of a plan. Furthermore, the contract
action is not an action which is in any way similar to a determination, avoidance
or recovery of preferences or fraudulent conveyances. Finally, the contract action
does not fall into the category of proceedings establishing priority of liens or to
approve the lease, use or turning over of estate property.
17. See supra note 6.
18. Id.
19. Subparts (A) and (0) both have been described as "catch-all" provisions.
See King, JurisdictionalProcedure Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, 38
VAND. L. REV. 675, 687-88 (1985). However, one extreme interpretation completely
disregarded subparts (A) and (0).
The apparent broad application that could be given to section 157(b)(2)(A)
and (0) should, however, be tempered by Northern Pipeline Construction Co.
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S. Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598
(1982) and the other categories of section 157(b)(2) which are more specific
in their terminology. . . . Clearly, subsections 157(b)(2)(A) and (0) should
not be interpreted to include related non-core proceedings since 28 U.S.C.A.
section 157(c)(1) specifically prevents a bankruptcy judge from rendering final
judgments in such instances. A common sense interpretation of the term
"core" would dictate that it include only those proceedings which are specifically defined in subsection (b)(2)(B) through (N) or in the Bankruptcy Code
itself.
Cameron v. Anderson (In re American Energy, Inc.), 50 B.R. 175 (Bankr. D.N.D.
1985).
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cases or arise under title 11 (implying that the language in the catchall provisions is not authoritative). 20 Because this definition alone is
not always very helpful, and because the fifteen examples found in
section 157(b)(2) are not exclusive and in fact are very general in
nature, definitions that have been provided by several bankruptcy
courts may be referred to as a means of obtaining a better understanding of what is meant by a "core" proceeding. One case 2 l in
particular expressed a number of factors to be examined in determining whether a proceeding is core or non-core:
of
1. Does the proceeding fall within one of the specific categories
22
core proceedings set forth in 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(a)(b)(2)?
2. To what extent does the resolution of the proceeding impact
upon the bankruptcy case? Does the ability of the debtor to reorganize
and say its creditors hinge on the quick resolution of 23the proceeding,
or is the proceeding merely "peripheral" to the case?
3. Is the proceeding one which
the Bankruptcy Court traditionally
24
has been empowered to decide?
4. Is there a "federal rule of decision provided for any of the
issues in the lawsuit?" If the proceeding arises entirely under state
law, does
it present substantial questions of law and fact for adjudi25
cation?
Another expression of the meaning of "core" holds that it "was
meant to encompass those proceedings which would not exist at law
in absence of the Bankruptcy Code." '2 6 Still another interpretation
defines core as including those proceedings at the core of the bankruptcy court's power - proceedings which would have no existence
27
outside of a bankruptcy proceeding.
The main reason for the restrictive interpretations by the district
courts of the provision describing core proceeding in section 157(b)(2)
is the case of Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe

20. King, Collier on Bankruptcy, § 3.01, at 3-35. Although, as discussed in
the text above, examples of core proceedings are provided in § 157(b)(2), the
Bankruptcy Code does not provide conclusive definitions of "core" or "non-core"
proceedings.
21. Baldwin-United Corp. v. Adams (Matter of Baldwin-United Corp.), 52
B.R. 541 (Bankr. S.D.Ohio 1985).
22. Id.at 546.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 547.
26. United States v. Farmers State Bank (Inre Alexander), 49 B.R. 733, 736
(Bankr. N.D. 1985).
27. See In re Seton-Scherr, Inc., 26 B.R. 563 (Bankr. N.D.Ohio 1983).
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Line Co. 28 (hereinafter "Marathon"). In Marathon, an action was
instituted by debtor-in-possession Northern Pipeline against Marathon
to recover damages for breach of contract. 29 The suit was commenced

pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act of 197830 ("Act") in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota two months
after Northern Pipeline had petitioned for reorganization in that
court.' Marathon filed a motion to dismiss the action on the ground
that the Bankruptcy Act unconstitutionally conferred Article III
judicial power upon bankruptcy judges who neither had life tenure
nor protection against salary diminution under the Act.32 The bankruptcy judge denied the motion, but on appeal to the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota, Marathon's motion to
dismiss was granted.33 On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the
34
United States affirmed the decision of the district court.
As the court stated in Shaford Companies Inc., v. Curr International Coffees, Inc. (In re Shaford Companies, Inc.),35 "the only
clear 'holding' of the divided court ' 3 6 in Marathon was stated in the
concurring opinion by Justice Rehnquist. In reaching his decision
that Northern Pipeline's lawsuit could not be adjudicated by a
bankruptcy court, Justice Rehnquist stated:
From the record before us, the lawsuit in which Marathon was named
defendant seeks damages for breach of contract, misrepresentation
and other counts which are the stuff of the traditional actions at
common law ....

There apparently is no federal rule of decision

provided for any of the issues in the lawsuit; the claims of Northern
arise entirely under state law ....

The lawsuit is before the Bankruptcy

Court only because the plaintiff
has previously filed a petition for
37
reorganization in that Court.
Consequently, it is not at all surprising that the district courts in
the cases discussed above have not been willing to interpret "core

28.
29.

458 U.S. 50 (1982).
Id. at 56.

30.
31.

Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat., 2549, effective Oct. 1, 1979.
Marathon, 458 U.S. at 56.

32.
33.
34.

Id. at 56-57.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 87.

35.

52 B.R. 832 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1985).

36. Id. at 835. The Court in Marathon was divided with Justice Brennan
writing the plurality opinion joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens.
Justice Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice O'Connor joined.
Former Chief Justice Burger wrote a dissenting opinion. Justice White wrote a
dissenting opinion in which Justice Powell and former Chief Justice Burger joined.
37.

Marathon, 458 U.S. at 90.
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proceedings" to permit bankruptcy judges to hear and finally determine state-based causes of action.
In discussing the scope to be given to the term "core" and section
157(b)(2), the court in the case of United States v. Farmers State
Bank (In re Alexander)3 8 provided a discussion which very accurately
sums up the findings expressed in the vast majority of the opinions
on the subject:
The term "core" proceeding is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code
but, by enumerated illustrations set out in section 157(b)(2), was meant
to encompass those proceedings which would not exist at law in absence
of the Bankruptcy Code. One court has defined the term as including
those proceedings at the core of the bankruptcy court's power-proceedings which would have no existence outside of a bankruptcy
proceeding .... The apparent broad application that could be given
to section 157(b)(2)(A) and (0) must be tempered by [Marathon] and
the specifically enumerated categories of section 157(b)(2). Although
section 157(b)(2) is a non-exclusive list of what constitutes core proceedings, this Court does not believe the sections or categories should
be interpreted or expanded so as to in effect emasculate the jurisdictional proscriptions of the Marathon case. . . . A common sense
interpretation of the term "core" would dictate that it includes only
those proceedings which are specifically set forth in either section
157(b)(2) or the Bankruptcy Code itself.3 9
Because the majority rule establishes that the contract action
illustrated in the hypothetical obviously would not be characterized
as a "core" proceeding, 40 the next step is to determine whether the
action might be characterized as a "related" proceeding. Generally,
"[t]he test for determining whether a civil proceeding is 'related to'
a bankruptcy case is 'whether the outcome of the proceeding could
conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in
bankruptcy.'' 4 "An action is 'related to' a bankruptcy case 'if the

38. 49 B.R. 733 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985).

39. Id. at 736.
40. In addition to Alexander, the following cases also hold that state law
contract claims which arguably fell within the catch-all provisions of § 157(b)(2)

were not "core" proceedings but were only "related" proceedings under § 157(c):
In re Castlerock Properties, 781 F.2d 159 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986); K-Rom Construction Corp. v. Behling (In re K-Rom Construction Corp.), 46 B.R. 745 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1985); Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Robinson Industries, Inc., 46 B.R. 464

(Bankr. D. Mass. 1985); Morse Elec. Co. v. Logicon (In re Morse Electric Co.), 47
B.R. 234 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985).
41. Howard Brown Co. v. Reliance Insurance Co., 66 B.R. 480, 481 (Bankr.
E.D.Pa. 1986), citing Bobroff v. Continental Bank (In re Bobroff), 766 F.2d 797,
802 (Bankr. 3d Cir. 1985).

19881

949

REMOVAL OF ACTION

outcome could alter the debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positively or negatively) and which in any way
impacts upon the handling and administration of the bankruptcy
estate." '' 42 Accordingly, "state law contract claims that do not specifically fall within the categories of core proceedings enumerated in
28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(2)(B)-(N) are related proceedings under 28
U.S.C.A. § 157(c) even if they arguably fit within the literal wording

of the two catch-all provisions, sections 157(b)(2)(A) and (O).

' 41

Although these cases indicate that the contract action by Insurance
Company A most likely will be treated as a related proceeding which
may be heard by a bankruptcy judge, bankruptcy court jurisdiction
in our hypothetical instance still is not certain. The bankruptcy judge
may choose either (1) to abstain from hearing the action "in the
interest of justice,"- or (2) find that abstention is mandated.4 One
case in particular examined applicable case law to determine tle
instances in which the section 1334(c)(2) mandatory abstention provision should be invoked 46 and found that four factors must be
present for invocation of mandatory abstention:

42. Howard Brown, 66 B.R. at 481, citing Bobroff, 766 F.2d at 802.
43. Castlerock, 781 F.2d at 162. In Howard Brown, the plaintiff had brought
action in state court to recover on a bond issued by the defendant as surety of the
debtor. The defendant subsequently removed the action to the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on the basis that there was substantial
claims and related issues between the parties in the state court action which related
to and were identical to issues that were to be adjudicated in the bankruptcy court.
The court found that the state proceeding was related to the bankruptcy case because
it would possibly affect the plaintiff's status as creditor of the debtor's bankruptcy
estate by reducing or even eliminating its claim against the bankruptcy estate.
In Castlerock, the defendant in a contract action filed a Chapter 11 proceeding
in bankruptcy court, thereby automatically staying the state contract action. When
the plaintiff filed for relief from the automatic stay, the defendant filed an answer
incorporating state law contract counterclaims against the plaintiff. Without entering
an order regarding the automatic stay, the bankruptcy judge elected to try the
counterclaims. After the denial of plaintiff's motion to dismiss or sever the counterclaims, in which the plaintiff questioned the propriety of deciding counterclaims
in a relief from a stay proceeding, the plaintiff filed an answer to the counterclaims.
The bankruptcy court tried the relief of stay issue and the defendant's counterclaims
and entered judgment for the defendant. The district court vacated the judgment,
holding that the bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction to determine the
substantive issues. As indicated above, the court of appeals found the contract
claims to be "related" proceedings and that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction
to enter judgment.
44. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(c)(1).
45. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(c)(2). See supra note 3 for the text of 28 U.S.C.A.
§§1334(c)(1) and (2).
46. Allegheny, Inc. v. Laniado Wholesale Co. (In re Allegheny, Inc.), 68
B.R. 183 (Bankr. W.D.Pa. -1986).
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1. There has been a timely motion by a party in interest;
2. the proceeding involves determinations of state law and is 'related' to the bankruptcy case;
3. the cause of action has already been commenced in a state court
tribunal; and
4. the47 cause of action can be timely adjudicated in said state
tribunal.
Accordingly, this test will be applied to the facts of the hypothetical
to determine whether the bankruptcy judge must abstain from hearing
the contract action by Insurance Company A against Corporation
X.
1.

Timely Motion By a Party In Interest

In deciding whether a motion for abstention was timely filed, the
court in Acolyte Elec. Corp. v. City of New York 8 stated:
The adversary proceeding was initiated on June 9, 1986 and the motion
before Chief Judge Weinstein seeking abstention and withdrawal of
reference was made on July 21, 1986. Although the word 'timely' is
not defined in title 28, and although there is no definitive pronouncement as to who has the burden of establishing or negating timeliness,
since there is no claim of prejudice or change of position49between
these dates, there is no reason to hold the motion untimely.
2.

The Proceeding Involves Determination of State Law and is
."Related" to the Bankruptcy Case

In the hypothetical, the action by Insurance Company A is a
common law breach of contract action brought in state court and
governed by state law. There are no federal statutes or federal
constitutional questions involved. Also, and as demonstrated previously, the contract action is related to the bankruptcy action under
the generally applied standard. 0
3.

The Cause of Action Has Already Been Commenced in State
Court

This third "prong" is self-explanatory. Upon review of the facts
of the hypothetical the answer is obviously affirmative.

47.
48.
49.
50.
discussed

Id. at 192.
69 B.R. 155 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986).
Id. at 179.
The "generally applied standard" referred to is the standard which was
above and used in In re Bobroff. See supra note 30.
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The Cause of Action Can Be Timely Adjudicated in State
Court

The party making the motion for abstention (Insurance Company
A in the hypothetical) cannot satisfy the requirement of this fourth
prong merely by making a "naked assertion" to that affect without
substantiating that assertion. 5 ' The question of whether the action
can be timely adjudicated in state court "requires an examination by
the court of the state court's calender, the status of the bankruptcy
proceeding, the complexity of the issues, and whether the state court
proceeding would prolong the administration, or liquidation of the
estate." '5 2 Obviously, the answer to this fourth prong will turn on
the factors as they exist in each particular case.
Upon close examination of section 1334(c)(2), it becomes apparent
that there is one more requirement for mandatory abstention (a fifth
prong not discussed by the court which expressed the four-prong
test): the action could not have been commenced in a court of the
United States absent jurisdiction under section 1334.13 This fifth
prong is crucial to the hypothetical case as it may be the only prong
which would prevent mandatory abstention.5 4 In other words, even
if the action against Corporation X in state court satisfies the
mandatory abstention requirements as set forth in the four-prong
test, the fifth prong would prevent mandatory abstention if the action
might otherwise have been brought in the federal court (as a diversity
case, for example).
Nevertheless, even if one necessary prong of the five-prong mandatory abstention test has not been satisfied, the bankruptcy court
still may exercise its discretion to abstain.55 When it appears that
most of the criteria for mandatory abstention have been satisfied,
the bankruptcy court "should give careful consideration whether it
would be appropriate to exercise [its] discretion to abstain under

51. Burgess v. Liberty Savings Assoc. (In re Burgess), 51 B.R. 300 (Bankr.
S.D.Ohio 1985).
52. Allard v. Benjamin (In re Delorean Motor Co.), 49 B.R. 900, 911 (Bankr.
E.D.Mich. 1985).
53. See supra note 3 for the text of § 1334(c)(2).
54. Interestingly, the cases cited by the court which established the fourprong test (see supra note 34) as authority for the formulation of the test all
recognized the additional requirement referred to above as the "fifth prong." See
In re Allied Mechanical and Plumbing Corp., 62 B.R. 873 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986);
Harley Hotels, Inc. v. Rain's International, Ltd., 57 B.R. 773 (Bankr. M.D.Pa.
1985).
55. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(c)(1).
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[section] 1334(c)(1). ' '5 6 Most likely then, Corporation X would not
have been successful in its effort to transfer the contract action to
the bankruptcy court.
In conclusion, an action, whether arising pre-petition or postpetition5 7 may be removed from state court to bankruptcy court if
the state court action is a "core" proceeding or is "related" to the
bankruptcy case. However, the case law interpreting the statutory
authority for removal to the bankruptcy courts places several obstacles in the path to removal. In order to obtain removal of an action
as a core proceeding, the action must fit within the confines of
extremely narrow interpretations of what constitutes "core". When
attempting removal of an action as a related proceeding, one must
overcome at least one of five prongs to avoid mandatory abstention
by a bankruptcy court. Even if one of the prongs is not satisfied
and mandatory abstention is avoided, case authority indicates that a
failure to overcome a majority of the prongs will result in discretionary abstention by the bankruptcy court.
Shaun Sweeney

56. U.I.U. Health and Welfare Fund v. Levit (In re Futura Industries), 69
B.R. 831, 834 (Bankr. E.D.Pa. 1987).
57. See supra note 2.

